If you know How Good Is Your Pot-Limit Hold’em? and How Good Is Your Pot-Limit Omaha? by Stewart Reuben (the latter is especially good) then you are already familiar with the format of this book. The author, Byron Jacobs, presents you 24 hands from real play and as the hand progresses you have to answer questions. There are typically between 8 and 11 questions for each hand presented, many of them in the form of “what would you do if this and that happened?”. Following each hand, there is an answer and analysis section that enables you to score your answers (100 is the maximum for every hand) and gives you an in-depth analysis of the possible plays.

Poker is no exact science thus the ‘correct’ play in a given situation may vary among good players. Let’s look at the first hand given in the book. Bizarre, the under the gun player, opens for a raise, Johnny, who has posted his big blind behind the button, calls in the cut-off seat, and you, in the big blind, call as well with A♣T♣. The flop comes T♥8♥6♦. You bet the flop, Bizarre raises, Johnny calls two bets cold and you call too. The turn is the 6♠. You bet your top pair top kicker and both player call. The river is the K♣ so the board now looks like this: T♥8♥6♦6♠K♣. What should you do? For Jacobs it is mandatory that you bet. “It is most unlikely that the king has helped anyone. It is crucial to pick up extra bets in hold’em. The pot is large and you will get call here, even from quite weak hands.” (p. 26)
The point, Jacobs is trying to make here, is that you shouldn’t be scared every time an overcard fells at the end. Picking up extra bets at the river is important. This is a valuable concept but I don’t think it is as clear cut in this example as Jacobs thinks. He gives 2 points for checking and 10 points for betting. Is checking really that much worse? Jacobs in his analysis tells you why it’s good to bet but he omits the drawbacks. There are at least three reasons to check and not bet that come to mind.
1) You don’t know with what hand Johnny is hanging around but you can be pretty sure about Bizarre’s hand. He raised under the gun before the flop and raised your flop bet. That means he has a premium holding. But he only called your turn bet that rules out an overpair to the board. We can now narrow down his likely hands: AK, AQ, AJ suited and KQ suited. Everything else like a pair of nines is extremely unlikely if he has some idea what he is doing. That leads to the conclusion that the king at the end is a scare card. It could very easily have hit Bizarre’s hand.
2) If you get raised you are in a very awkward position. You have to call because the pot is large and you can’t allow someone to make a move at you. In other words you are laying 2 to 1. You lose two bets if you are behind and you win one bet (it’s unreasonable to assume that both opponents call you with worse hands) if your hand is the best.
3) By checking you can pick up a bet if someone tries a desperation bluff and it saves you a bet in case you are beaten.
To sum that up, I think betting at the end is reasonable though it’s a close decision between betting and checking. But betting is surely not five times better than checking as Jacobs claims.

In the above mentioned example I don’t have a problem with the advice, just with the scoring. Here are two examples where I disagree with Jacobs. Hand No. 14 is a classic example: You hold pocket kings under the gun and ponder what to do. The situation is outlined as follows: “You are UTG with your black kings. The game … is a rather tight, tough game. Most flops are taken three-handed or four at most and many are heads-up. There are only a couple of loose players.” (p. 102)
Jacobs preferred play is to limp. Here is his reasoning: “In these tight games you will find it hard to draw players in if you open-raise UTG. Good players will just not give you any action. It is often a better play to limp, hoping for a raise, when you can three-bet and build a pot with your premium holding. Of course, you are running the risk that weaker hands will come in cheaply and may outdraw you. However, hands like K-K do not come along very often, and it is worth taking a risk to maximize your potential gains.” (p. 105)

My experience is the following: In limit hold’em games, if you see somebody limp with pocket kings it’s nearly always a weak player who tries to be smart (in no limit limping has its merits). Do you really want to give someone with a lone ace or another weak holding a cheap shot to draw out on you? In poker theory books the two most mentioned reasons why you should raise are to narrow down the field and to put more money in the pot. Of course this is true. But there is another important reason why you want to raise with your big hands: because it gives you a better idea where you are at during the hand. Let’s say you raise with your pocket kings and get two opponents. The flop comes J72. With this board there is no question that you have the best hand (there is a remote chance somebody flopped a set of sevens or deuces) and there are not too many dangerous turn cards (any ace, any jack and probably the connecting cards with the jack).

On the other hand, let’s say you just limp with your kings, the two players behind you call. Now everybody gets excited because a volume pot emerges and people start to call with all sort of funny hands because they want to be part of it. All of a sudden eight players are seeing the same flop as above: J72. Now you can’t feel comfortable anymore with your kings. Hands like J7, J2, 72 are not unusual in this case. Worse yet, you are out of position, you can’t do much to reduce the field and even if you currently hold the best hand, you still have to survive the turn and the river. You are practically playing in the dark and it might be expensive to find out that you are beat.

In my opinion, which I share with most poker authors, raising with pocket kings before the flop is definitly the right decision even in tight games. If the game is so that it’s likely that nobody will give you any action when you raise under the gun there are two potential solutions. First, look for a better game. I don’t know about you but I’m no addicted gambler. If I think I don’t have an adequate edge in a game I stop playing immediately. Why waste my time in bad games? Second, start raising with all sorts of hands. Collecting blinds adds up. After a while the tighties will realize what you are doing and start to call or raise you. When that happens switch back to your old standards. Raise when you are dealt a big hand and you will get action.

The second example (hand No. 10) is interesting because it deals with an all-in player. It “is a short-handed six-player $20-$40 game. You are in the cut-off with 8♣7♣. This is a good game with soft players who are too loose preflop and tend to go to the river with pretty mediocre holdings. Billyboy, who is on the button, fits this description, although he is more aggressive then the other players at the table. Dave is on the big blind and has become short stacked. He now has only $60 left. In fact, having posted his blind, he is now down to precisely $40.” (p. 115)
You raise, both Billyboy and Dave call. The flop is K♦9♥6♥. Dave bets his last $20 and now it’s up to you. Think a while what you would do before I give you the book answer and my thoughts.

Jacobs gives 0 points for folding, 2 for checking and 10 for betting. His explanation goes like this: “There are numerous drawing possibilities on this flop, and Dave is all-in and could have almost anything. You have flopped a straight draw and probably have eight outs (a third heart could make someone a flush). However, there are many possible holdings for Dave against which you have extra outs by making a pair, e.g. 6-x, a flush draw, a gutshot draw, or two random high cards not including a king. There is a very decent chance that your raise will force Billyboy out of the pot, which would be an excellent result. You then get $20 of your $40 back and achieve a free showdown against Dave with very decent chances, whatever he holds. Even if Billyboy calls or raises, you have a good draw with two cards to come. Calling, in comparison, is rather feeble. Billyboy then has sufficient pot odds to justify calling with as few as six outs, and there are all sorts of holdings he can then call with that you would be bad news for you.” (p. 118f)

First notice that the statement “Dave is all-in and could have almost anything” is wrong. He called your raise pre-flop and led out post-flop though he didn’t have to. That means he must have something whatever that might be. Now look at your hand, all you have is eight high. Your eight high is not going to win against Dave unless you improve. In all likelihood Dave has either a king or a nine in which case you have 8 outs or he has a flush draw which gives you four additional outs for pairing but costs you two outs for your straight cards.

Now the question is, do you want Billyboy out or in. Contrary to what Jacobs thinks you want him in. You want him in because you have to make your hand and you want to have someone who pays you off in case you do. If you beat Dave at the end and lose to Billyboy that is too bad but there is nothing you could do against that. What if Billy has a flush draw. Even if you raise the flop and bet the turn Billyboy is not going to lay down his flush draw. Let’s say the river card is the five of hearts that gives you the straight but makes Billyboy a flush. You can construct some cases in which not raising the flop costs you the pot but these are all long shots. E.g. the turn card is a seven, Billyboy has A7 (and calls the flop bet), Dave has no king and no nine but the flush draw and he doesn’t improve on the river. Conclusion: Let Billyboy live and hope that he pays you off in case you make your straight.

I hope my comments didn’t give you a wrong impression by focussing on three examples where I think his judgment of the situations are questionable. Jacobs is doing a good job presenting and explaining his conclusions and this is actually a book with pretty solid advice. My only suggestion to the author for for improvement would be to group the hands thematically and to expand the number of hand examples. E. g. hand No. 20 is about heads-up play. The analysis of the hand is excellent. There is not much about heads-up play in print. Why not make a chapter about it with 5 to 10 examples instead of just one?

Jacobs book is well worth reading, especially recommend for aspiring mid limit players.

One funny observation at the end: The book contains odds tables for starting hands, flops etc. with the following hint: “This information … is Copyright © 2003 Andrew Kinsman.” Does that mean when I want to write that a line saying “it’s 220 to 1 to be dealt pocket aces before the flop” that I have to ask Mr. Kinsman for permission first?

(Tristan Steiger)

Buy the Jacobs book!