If
you are a chess player and want to improve your game you not only
learn the theoretical aspects of the game but also you have to study
positions. The same holds true for backgammon. Astonishingly for the
game of poker there is a whole host of theory books but no book that puts
the emphasis on examples from real playing situations. With the book
“Middle Limit Holdem” by Bob Ciaffone and Jim Brier this has changed.
It is no coincidence that Bob Ciaffone is an excellent chess and
backgammon player. If you are familiar with Jim Brier’s column in the
Card Player magazine you probably know what to expect from this book.
The difference is that the theoretical explanations in the book are much
more detailed. Nearly all the chapters in the book are divided into two
parts: theory and practice. The first part gives you the theoretical
background and the second part shows you how to apply this knowledge to
examples taken from real play. That’s a very clever approach. Let’s talk
first about the theoretical explanations before I will say something
about the concrete examples the authors use to illustrate those
explanations.
The structure of the book is conventional: chapters on preflop, flop, turn and
river play; chapters about general hold’em principles; chapters about special
topics like slowplaying, shorthanded play, and so on. Generally speaking
the advice they give you is reliable and logically sound. I will
concentrate on two points: Preflop play and playing overcards. The
recommendations they give you what hands to play in early and middle
position is about what you can find in most hold’em books. Interesting
is the part about late position play. All hold’em books so far
overestimate the value of small unsuited connectors. The two authors
tell you that you should not call with unsuited connectors in late
position that are worse than J – T offsuit no matter how many players
have entered the pot. This advice sounds surprising. I have never seen that
in print before but I think it’s correct. I still have to see the player
who really makes money playing 9 – 7 offsuit or trash hands like that.
On the other hand Ciaffone and Brier underestimate the value of being
suited. Let’s look at the figures. If you have two suited cards there is
about a 5 percent chance to make your flush. In a ten handed pot the win
rate for an average hand is 10 percent, so the 5 percent advantage for
the suited hand against the same hand unsuited is huge. Of course the
actual advantage is not 5 percent, it’s less. Basically there are two
reasons for that. First, you make your flush but you would have won
anyway. This happens quite often when you have two big suited cards and
hit one or two of your rank. Second, you make your flush but you run
into a superior hand (higher flush, full house, quads or a straight
flush). So the actual advantage of being suited is less than 5 percent.
How much it is depends on two factors: your starting hand and the number
of players contesting the pot. Computer simulations show that in a
family pot every suited hand is profitable. I wouldn’t go so far and
call with T – 2 suited or 9 – 4 suited but I think in late position with
many players already in you should call quite liberally with suited
hands.
According to Ciaffone and Brier how to play overcards is one of the most
difficult decisions in Texas hold’em. But when you read the short and
somewhat superficial theoretical section about overcard play you get the
impression it’s quite easy, especially in multi-player pots, just check
and fold. “It may sound like wimpy poker to raise preflop with a hand
like ace-king and then check, planning to fold when the flop gets bet,
but that is exactly what has to be done in many situations.” So when
should you bet your overcards? The authors think you should bet if you
have the best hand or if the bet will win the pot for you. Of course
these situations only come up in short-handed pots. Both concepts are
valid but at least two other concepts come to mind why you want to bet
your overcards: because it will improve your chances to win the pot and
because your bet has a positive EV. To illustrate the former point here
is a hand I played in 20 – 40 game at the Mirage. I limped in middle
position with K-J of hearts. A tight professional raised on the button
which was bad news for me. Only the lady in the big blind called so we
took the flop three-handed: 8-5-2, two hearts. The lady checked, I
checked and the pro bet as expected. We both called. The turn was the 10
of clubs. Now the lady bet. What should I do? If it were heads-up it
would have been an easy decision, I would have called. I knew the lady;
she played in a very straightforward fashion. I was absolutely sure she
had a pair of tens nothing more nothing less. To win the pot I had to
show her a better hand, no room for fancy plays. But the pro behind me
created a problem because his hand killed some of my overcard outs. If
he had A-K or A-J two of my outs are dead. If he has pocket aces or
pocket kings all of my overcard outs are dead. If I could get him out,
this would improve my chances to win the pot. I was convinced he would
fold two overcards if I would raise but I wasn’t sure what he would do
if he held an overpair. I knew he had a lot of respect for me and I
hoped he would read me for a set. The last point that convinced me that
raising was the right play was that it actually cost me nothing, because
if he had an overpair he would raise himself if I only called. So I
raised, the pro pondered and finally threw his hand away. The river was
a king. The lady checked, I bet and took the pot after the lady had
called. Then the pro started moaning: “Oh my god, I folded pocket aces!”
Ciaffone and Brier both know this. At another place in the book they
briefly mentioned that concept but they think it doesn’t have much
value. The funny thing is this: Shortly after the book was on the
market, Jim Brier published in the Card Player magazine a hand that was
very similar to the hand I described above. Here it is:
“You limp in from middle position with the K
♣10♣
behind two early-position players. Everyone folds to the button, who
calls, as does the small blind. The big blind raises and everyone calls.
There is $120 in the pot and six players. The flop is J♠9♣3♣, giving you a flush draw, a gutshot-straight
draw, and an overcard. The small blind checks and the big blind bets.
The first early-position player folds, but the second early-position
player calls. What should you do? Answer: Raise […] In the actual hand,
the player raised. Both the button and the small blind folded. The big
blind reraised and the other early-position player folded rather than
call a double raise back to him. The player called. The turn was the A♥.
Both players checked. The turn was the K♦.
The big blind bet and the player called, having made a pair of kings at
the river. He won, as the big blind had the Q♠Q♣. The button moaned and stated that he had had the
A♦3♦.“ (Card Player, April 12, 2002, p. 42)
The reason why Jim thinks
you should raise is because with that many outs your raise has a
positive EV. Of course this is correct but a second reason is to protect
your overcard as seen in the actual hand. Despite my critique about some
points all in all the theoretical explanations are very good and well
presented. What I like especially is the emphasis the authors put on the
number of players in the pot. Every good player knows that position and
the size of the pot are of major importance. Ciaffone and Brier make it
clear that the number of players contesting the pot is often of equal
importance.
The second main part of the book consists of over 400 examples. The
examples are grouped according to the structure of the book as far as the
subject is concerned. After the theoretical explanations the
reader is confronted with a multitude of examples. The scenario is
presented and then it is up to the reader to come up with the right
conclusion (“What do you do?”). Of course not only the answer is given
but an explanation as well. I found nearly all the answers reasonable
but that doesn’t necessarily mean I did come to the same conclusion. But
that isn’t the point. Just make sure you have taken into consideration
all the arguments Ciaffone and Brier use to back their decision.
Generally speaking I think the two authors overemphasize the risks in a
given situation which may lead to too passive play. In hold’em you often
have to take some risks. Frankly speaking I have never seen a winning
player who only bets the nuts. Let me give you just one example.
“A $15 -
$30 game. You are in middle position with A
♠Q♠
and raise after an early player limps in. Only the big blind and the
early limper call. There is $100 in the pot and three players. The flop
is: T♥9♣8♦, giving you a gutshot straight-draw in addition to your two overcards. Both opponents
check. What do you do?”
Ciaffone and Brier think you should check.
Basically they give two reasons why you should check: You have nothing
and the board is highly coordinated which makes it probable that it
helps at least one of your opponents. Though I think the arguments are
sound, I would bet every time in this spot. There are a couple of
reasons for that. 1) If you don’t bet you are virtually surrendering the
pot. No matter what comes on the turn if somebody bets into you, you
can’t call. The only exception is if the turn brings a jack. The jack
gives you a straight but it’s not the nuts. If somebody bets the best
you can hope for is probably to split the pot. Even if you hit one of
your hole cards on the turn you can’t call. A queen gives you top pair
but anyone with a jack has you beat. I don’t think an ace is much help
for you if somebody bets into you. No decent player would bet Axs
because he would (correctly) fear that you have an ace with a big
kicker. So if somebody bets into you it means he has at least two pair.
2) There is $100 in the pot and it only costs you $15 to try to win the
pot. If you succeed more than 12 per cent of the time you show a profit.
Is this possible? I think so. 3) The flop looks dangerous for you but it
might look dangerous for your opponents too which makes it easier for
them to fold. 4) A bet by you might make a better hand to fold. E. g.
the early player could have A8s and the big blind a pair of fives. Is
this unrealistic? I don’t think so. Don’t get me wrong, I don’t think
the answer by Ciaffone and Brier is unreasonable or wrong. I just prefer
to bet. I wouldn’t argue with anyone who thinks you should check in this
situation. It’s a close decision. This leads us to one of the problems I
have with the examples. The authors tell you what you should do but they
normally don’t tell you how much of a mistake it is if you don’t follow
their advice. Of course you can’t quantify that precisely the way Caro
is doing it (“Book of Tells”) which is totally ridiculous. But you
should tell the reader if it is a major error, a small error, a toss-up
or something like that. The second problem I have with the examples is
that Ciaffone and Brier tell you what to do in that specific situation
but not how to proceed. Let’s again take the example mentioned above.
You should check and take a free card. Ok. But what should you do if a
blank falls on the turn and nobody bets? Should you bet or check again?
What do you do if a jack comes on the turn and somebody bets into you?
Should you call or raise? Maybe this would go beyond the scope of this
book but some hints would be welcomed.
Obviously Ciaffone and Brier were in a hurry to publish the book because
there is some oddness and inconsistency that should be corrected in a
future edition.
-
What is better to have 14 or 15 outs? After reading Ciaffone’s and
Brier’s book I’m no longer sure:
“You have a ‘super’ draw [with 14 outs] … making you even money” (p.
124)
“This is 14 outs … You are about even money” (p. 268)
“… you have 14 outs … so you are a shade over even money” (p. 129)
“You have 14 outs […] You are a mathematical favorite” (p. 121)
“You have … a total of 15 outs … You are about even money” (p. 125)
Of course there is nothing wrong with each statement. The problem is
that the wording is not consistent.
-
On page 219 you read: “A $30-$60 game with a $20 small blind”. Now the
attentive reader will think this must be a specially structured $30-$60
game. But if you study the dozens of earlier $30-$60 examples you will
notice that the small blind was always two thirds of the big blind but
it was never explicitly mentioned. If you stress the fact that the small
blind is $20 you should do this the first time a $30-$60 example is
given otherwise this might lead to confusion.
-
In chapter 26, example 3 the big blind folds two times (p. 220).
-
At the end of the book there is an odds table for frequently seen
match-ups (p. 329). Unfortunately of the 18 examples only 7 are correct,
11 are wrong.
Beside these minor criticisms there is no doubt that this is an excellent
book. Everyone who is willing to invest the time and effort to study the
examples thoroughly will derive much benefit from it. This book is a
perfect addition to “Hold’em for Advanced Players”. The latter for the
theory, the former to put the theory into practice.
(Tristan Steiger)
Buy the book!
More books by Bob Ciaffone:
Pot-Limit & No-Limit Poker
Improve Your Poker
Omaha Holdem Poker: The Action Game
